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In this essay I briefly examine two aspects of Bernard Williams’ thought, and argue that they are important in the attempt to
give a unitary interpretation of his philosophical enterprise. These are the ideas that philosophy is an eminently reflexive
activity, and the significance Williams recognised to the value of human beings considered as individuals. It is my contention
that these two aspects were strongly interrelated in Williams’ philosophical production. By focusing on them, Williams’
philosophy proves to be a unitary and positive project, in spite of what some of his critics maintain, with clear limits, and a
precise direction of enquiry which I believe deserves to be pursued further.
Just a Negative Philosopher?
Readers who are new to Bernard Williams are
likely to feel disoriented upon first approaching his work,
which appears to be at once extremely engaging and
philosophically unsettling. What we find is a sparkling
mind, a thinker who would take a line of reasoning to its
extreme conclusions, who made the best use of the
technical equipment of philosophy, and entertained
constant exchange with its most eminent protagonists,
past and present. But it is also apparent that Williams’
thought eludes a univocal and systematic elucidation. The
deeper one goes into his reflections, the more it seems as
if Williams himself cuts the ground from under his
readers’ feet, suggesting that it is in the very nature of
philosophy not to provide any firm point of reference.
What seems to be missing is an “Archimedean point” (to
use the efficacious expression Williams introduced in
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy to deny the existence
of any neutral justification of the ethical life) that will
allow us to assess the balance of the issues at stake, and
also to mark the boundaries of philosophy as a
circumscribed and recognizable discipline (1985, ch.
2).[1] 
In this sense, Williams appears to betray the
expectation with which the analytic philosopher, as
Williams regarded himself (1985, preface; 2003, 2006a),
is usually met: to furnish an effective interpretive key that
will bring clarity to our attempts at making sense of
things. Analytic philosophy did present crucial strengths
for Williams; after all,
[i]n its insistence, at its best, on the values of
unambiguous statement and recognizable
argument; its patience; its lack of contempt for
the familiar; its willingness to meet with the
formal and natural sciences; its capacity for
genuine and discussable progress – in all this,
and despite its many often catalogued
limitations, it remains the only real philosophy
there is (2006a, p. 168).
But Williams also believed that analytic philosophy lacks
certain specific characteristics which, even though they
can be seen as opposed to each other, are often both put
forward as its distinctive peculiarities. Firstly, analytic
philosophy is presented as “being higher-order” (2003,
p. 25), that is, as being able to conduct its investigations
by occupying a “meta” position which is conceived as
theoretically detached with respect to its matter of study.
Secondly, analytic philosophy is frequently thought of as
being in principle assimilable “to the aims, or at least to
the manners, of the sciences” (2006b, p. 182). 
Williams’ distrust in the capacity of analytic
philosophy to exercise any sovereign or scientific status
has earned him the label of a “destructive” or “negative”
philosopher (Chappell, 2010). Williams, that is, may be
seen as very good at bringing to the surface the internal
fallacies of philosophical reasoning, and at checkmating
those who believe in the constructive powers of
philosophy. However, he would to critics be unable to
propose any convincing alternative theoretical edifice to
the debris produced by his brilliant and razor-edged
acumen. However, a closer look reveals this to be too
simplistic a view. In what follows I shall suggest a
possible interpretive line, to be developed more fully, to
attempt a unitary reading of Williams’ philosophical
enterprise by referring to its intrinsic reflexive features,
and to the uninterrupted interest Williams showed in the
value of individuals, throughout his entire career.
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As I shall argue, notwithstanding his continual
emphasising of the “limits of philosophy” and of its
incapacity as an independent branch of knowledge to
answer by itself to the basic Socratic question “how one
should live” (1985, p. 1), Williams was not the
inconclusive theoretician he is frequently portrayed as.
His thinking discloses a uniformity of purpose and a
methodological direction which I think are worth
investigating, in the hope of providing a convincing
starting-point from which both to perceive Williams’
work as a coherent whole, and to stress its originality in
the current philosophical landscape. 
Reflection and History
For Williams, the evident strength of doing
philosophy in the analytical tradition was that of
proceeding according to a precise and reliable method of
framing philosophical reasons and arguments. In doing
this, analytic philosophy appears to be committed to the
central value which a proper way of doing philosophy
must follow, that of truthfulness. However, such a
rigorous, i.e. truthful, way of doing philosophy (to which
Williams dedicated an entire book, Truth and
Truthfulness [2002]), is not the offshoot of any
constitutive characteristic of philosophy, which is
peculiar to it and elevates it above the rest of human
knowledge and practices. On further inspection, this
higher theoretical status of philosophy turns out to be just
a chimera, since philosophy itself, be it analytical or
otherwise, appeared to Williams to all effects to be
compromised with the objects of its enquiry. 
Williams seemed to think, in other words, that
on his or her part, the philosopher is in no position to
assume an external perspective from which to emit his or
her verdict on reality, since he or she is fatally embedded
within reality, and philosophical investigation is
necessarily an activity to be conducted from within those
bounds. This doesn’t deprive philosophy of its capacity of
explaining and giving proper sense. In fact, philosophy
can obtain for Williams the argumentative efficacy we
seek by developing a specific form of truthfulness, one
which displays the two basic virtues of Accuracy and
Sincerity. These are the virtues whereby “you do the best
you can to acquire true beliefs, and what you say reveals
what you believe” (2002, p. 11). But what is
quintessential to the practice of philosophy is that it
comprehends an honest and serious exercise of the
imagination. “[B]eing soberly truthful does not exclude,”
Williams stated in “Contemporary Philosophy: A Second
Look,” “but may actually demand, the imagination”
(2003, p. 34). As he clarified in “What Might Philosophy
Become?,” “philosophy will not speak to our concerns
unless it sounds right, unless the manner of the work
itself expresses what the writer feels is living or
alternatively derivative and phony, and that is likely to be
an imaginative achievement” (2006c, p. 212). So this
confusion of different levels, that of the explanans and
that of the explanandum, is in fact only apparent. It
corresponds instead to a precise and positive way of
conceptualising philosophy and philosophical activity,
which Williams presented in “Philosophy as a Humanistic
Discipline” as “part of a more general attempt to make the
best sense of our life, and so of our intellectual activities,
in the situation in which we find ourselves” (2006b, p.
182). Philosophy, that is to say, reveals itself to be an
eminently reflexive activity; reflexive in the sense that the
principles with which philosophy engages in its pursuit of
sense enjoy no privileged status, but are instead the
product of the reality to which they are applied. 
Williams’ point is that whereas natural science
may well be guided by the ideal of an “Absolute
Conception of the World” in its attempt to get things right
and describe the world “as it is in itself,” or “as it is
anyway” (2006b, p. 184; 1978, 1985), in doing
philosophy this same ideal may lead us dangerously
astray. This is because from the viewpoint of philosophy
“there simply is no conception of the world which is not
conceptualized in some way or another,” since “when we
reflect on our conceptualisation of the world, we might be
able to recognize from inside it that some of our concepts
and ways of representing the world are more dependent
than others on our own perspective, our peculiar and local
ways of apprehending things” (2006b, p. 185).
In turn, this inescapability from a conceptual
dimension fundamentally depended, for Williams, on the
fact that philosophy simply cannot be conceived
separately from an historical consideration of the notions
it makes use of, and the main problem of much
contemporary analytic philosophy is recognized by
Williams to be precisely the lack of any historical
consciousness of its conceptual categories. As becomes
clearer especially in the collection of essays entitled The
Sense of the Past (2006d), the study of philosophy
conflates with that of the history of philosophy; in other
words, “philosophy itself must involve more than abstract
argument, and [...] it must engage itself in history. In this
Theoretical & Applied Ethics Vol. 1, Issue 3, Fall 20117
and in other respects, philosophy cannot be too pure if it
really wants to do what it sets out to do” (2002, p. 39). 
The outcome of this synthesis is a form of
critical reflexivity which presents two interconnected
aspects. On the one hand, our present philosophical
conceptions are continuously brought into question by
Williams in the light of those from the past, so that an
increasingly aware and deeper comprehension of the
ideas by which we observe reality is reached. On the
other hand, conceptions from the past are never seen by
Williams from an atemporal point of view, “as though
they had appeared in last month’s issue of Mind” (2006e,
p. 258; see also 2006f, p. 344). On the contrary, “[w]hat
we must do is to use the philosophical materials that we
now have to hand, together with historical understanding,
in order to find in, or make from, the philosophy of the
past a philosophical structure that will be strange enough
to help us to question our present situation and the
received picture of the tradition, including those materials
themselves” (2006e, p. 264).
The upshot is a renovated perspective which far
from being just mocking and dismissive toward analytic
philosophy, takes instead the form of a programmatic
manifesto: 
the reflective understanding of our ideas and
motivations, which I take to be by general
agreement a philosophical aim, is going to
involve historical understanding. Here history
helps philosophical understanding, or is part of
it. Philosophy has to learn the lesson that
conceptual description (or, more specifically,
analysis) is not self-sufficient; and that such
projects as deriving our concepts a priori from
universal conditions of human life, though they
indeed have a place (a greater place in some
areas of philosophy than others), are likely to
leave unexplained many features that provoke
philosophical enquiry. (2006b, p. 192)
Thus, for Williams philosophy surely consists in a
rigorous conceptual analysis, but this cannot be obtained
in the absence of a consciousness of the historical
dimension of philosophical activity. In turn, this activity
unfolds as a reflexive scrutiny to which the practice of
philosophy submits itself in the course of time.
Eventually, this scrutiny involves an effort of imagination
that, as I will hold, calls directly upon human beings as
single individuals.
Reflection and Individuality
Williams’ intellectual curiosity was wide-
ranging, and went well beyond the boundaries of pure
philosophical speculation. One thinks for example of his
interest in classical Greek philology, or of his passion for
opera (1993, 2006g). Nonetheless, he was eminently a
moral philosopher, and his idea of the reflexive nature of
philosophy visibly appears in his treatment of ethics. In
the course of its history and through to this day, the
ambition of much philosophical ethics has been to devise
a theory for the resolution of ethical dilemmas. This
would be a method which, even if it were not to have a
substantial effect on the conduct of individuals, might
still aspire to validity in affording definitive and coherent
justification to morality. This has been the aspiration in
particular of the two “methods of ethics” provided by
Kantianism and Utilitarianism, both of which had
Williams as one of their most intransigent critics. In both
of these great ethical systems, “ethics” has been translated
in terms of “morality,” i.e. in terms of a philosophical,
principle-based structure organising the good and the
right, put forward to give some legitimating order to an
otherwise purportedly chaotic ethical realm (1985).
Williams was persuaded that any such project was
destined to failure.
That disbelief is clearly expressed in Ethics and
the Limits of Philosophy, but can be found in almost all of
Williams’ work, from the papers collected in Problems of
the Self, Moral Luck, Making Sense of Humanity, and In
the Beginning Was the Deed, to other works such as
Morality: An Introduction to Ethics, “A Critique of
Utilitarianism,” the introduction to Utilitarianism and
Beyond, and Shame and Necessity (1972, 1973a, 1973h,
1981a, 1995a, 2005a; Williams & Sen, 1982). Unwilling
to seal himself off within the confines of any doctrine that
aspired to stand as the final word, Williams never
relented in his scepticism towards the authoritative claims
with which moral philosophy handles the ambiguities that
preside over the ethical
sphere. One is able to
appreciate the meaning
Williams attributed to
ethical thinking in the light
of this fundamental distrust;
whereas it cannot have
absolute validity, ethics
gains its full significance when it places the person in his
or her concrete singularity at the centre of its concerns.
The point of departure for ethics must be the individual
being, conceived as irremediably finished, embodied, and
projected into contingent circumstances that do not
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appear to be structured according to any recognisable and
coherent order, but are only governed by chance. The
more we become able to appreciate the tragic essence of
this condition, the more our value as individuals is
amplified. 
Such an interest in the individuality of people
stands as the leitmotiv of many of Williams’ favourite
ethical themes, as his various examples make clear. One
thinks of his recognition of the centrality of the bodily
aspect and mortal nature of human beings in the
definition of their personal identities (see “Personal
Identity and Individuation,” “Bodily Continuity and
Personal Identity,” “Imagination and the Self,” “The Self
and the Future,” “Are Persons Bodies?,” “The
Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of
Immortality” [1973b, 1973c, 1973d, 1973e, 1973f,
1973g]). There is then the significance Williams
attributed to notions such as character and moral luck for
the appreciation of these identities in properly moral
terms (see “Persons, Character and Morality” and “Moral
Luck” [1981b, 1981c]). This concern for the individuality
of people also stands in the background of his famous
objection in “A Critique of Utilitarianism”, that the theory
did not give proper weight to personal integrity (1973h,
pp. 108-118). Moreover, Williams’ idea that all reasons
are internal and not external, and have to be taken back to
the “subjective motivational set” of the agents, can again
be understood in line with a fundamental solicitude for
the uniqueness of persons (see “Internal and External
Reasons” and “Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of
Blame” [1981e, 1995b. See also 1995f, pp. 186-94;
2001]).
The relevance of individuals then appears in all
its seriousness in Williams’ more specifically political
writings, collected in his In the Beginning Was the Deed.
Much of his observations there are against those forms of
“political moralism” (2005b, p. 2), (epitomized by many
modern Kantian liberal theories, for example that of
Rawls) which for Williams do not possess a proper
consciousness of the inevitably historical origins of their
normative claims. The result of this ingenuity is that they
miss the important truth, whereby the central, pre-
theoretical problem in political philosophy is to deal with
“the ‘first’ political question” of “the securing of order,
protection, safety, trust, and the condition of cooperation”
(2005b, 3). Only by giving a convincing answer to this
primarily “Hobbesian” constraint is it possible for
Williams to put a check on the violence some human
beings can arbitrarily exercise on other human beings,
and therefore guarantee the favourable conditions in
which the value of truthfulness can fully flourish (2002,
ch. 10).
Given this, a promising way to see Williams as
advancing a positive philosophical program is to
recognise, alongside reflexivity, the full importance of
what he mentioned as “formal individualism.” As
Williams explains in “Making Sense of Humanity,”
formal individualism consists of the idea whereby “there
are ultimately no actions that are not the actions of
individual agents, [and] the actions of an individual are
explained in the first place by the psychology of that
individual” (1995d, pp. 85-86). In “Formal and
Substantial Individualism” Williams noted that “‘formal
individualism’ roughly says that intentional action is
individual, and that its explanation involves a
consciousness, potential or actual, that refers to the agent”
(1995e, p. 126). So formal individualism was primarily
presented by Williams as a methodological approach to
human psychology. But I believe formal individualism
can be taken as a wider underlying criterion running
through the whole of his philosophical production. For
his individualism and the reflexivity which emerges from
his general philosophical approach can be seen as the two
sides of the same coin. In fact, if it makes any sense to
talk about philosophy as a reflexive activity, and if this
implies a serious use of the human imagination, then
philosophical practice has to be understood as “a
particular kind of reflexive sensitivity” (2006a, p. 167)
exercised by single individuals in their efforts to freely
and progressively clarify their condition of specific
human beings placed in contingent socio-historical
realities.
Hence, it is in ethical (and political) reflection
that for Williams the “limits of philosophy” become most
clearly manifest. Conversely, for philosophy to acquire
some degree of pertinence to our condition, it has to be
conceived in the terms of a “humanistic discipline,” as a
form of reflexive historical understanding of the human
condition, which is the same as saying that philosophy is
perpetually engaged in the process of redefining the
meaning of its propositions and of its own history. This
was a re-elaboration that in Williams’ later philosophy
(especially in Truth and Truthfulness) was to assume the
form of a peculiar genealogy of concepts.
Giving his preference to an idea of philosophy
that never loses sight of the domain of human existence,
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Williams is in company with giants of thought, such as
Aristotle, David Hume and Friedrich Nietzsche. This
might give rise to the temptation to read Williams as
nothing more than one of their epigoni. As a matter of
fact, at times Williams appears to be a follower of Hume,
especially if one considers the “sub-Humean model”
concerning the nature of internal reasons he presented in
“Internal and External Reasons” (1981d, p. 102). At other
times he seems to have something in common with neo-
Aristotelians, at least in relation to his antitheoretical
spirit, for which he has been catalogued among the
exponents of contemporary Virtue Ethics (Crisp & Slote,
1997). Lastly, his pursuing a “vindicatory” genealogy
(2002, pp. 36-38), and the preference he granted to a
“minimalist” moral psychology sheds what can be seen as
a Nietzschean light on his philosophical convictions (see
“Nietzsche’s Minimalist Moral Psychology,” 1995c).
Williams was surely indebted to the teachings of all these
authors, and many traces of their influences can be
encountered in his writings. Nonetheless, he remained a
profoundly autonomous thinker, whose originality
definitively deserves, and still has yet, to be fully
appreciated.[2]
Notes
1. Unless otherwise indicated, all citations refer to the works of Bernard Williams.
2. I would like to thank Catherine Bearfield, Mattia Bilardello, Matteo Falomi and Chris Herrera for their useful comments on a previous draft.
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